前沿 | American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）2019.04

让每一个人自由地理解政治

让世界各地的学人成果互联互通

让政治学人的核心关切得到传播

让每位闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空

政治学人始终在路上

本期国际化部为大家带来了《美国政治科学评论》2019年第4期文章编译。

编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。

PART
一

期刊简介

American Political Science Review（美国政治科学评论）创刊于1906年，是政治学最早的学术研究期刊。提供同行评审的文章和评论整个学科子领域的论文。IF:3.444

期刊涉及领域包括政治学理论、美国政治、公共政策、公共行政、比较政治和国际关系。

PART
二

期刊目录

Research Article

1. Who Leads? Who Follows? Measuring Issue Attention and Agenda Setting by Legislators and the Mass Public Using Social Media Data

   谁领导？谁跟随？利用社交媒体数据测量立法者和公众对问题的关注程度和议程设置
   

2. Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design

   说服敌人：用包含优先级的选择和分配设计估算政党媒介的说服作用
   

3. The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate

   党派还是钱包？美国参议院的不平等代表
   

4. Pitch Perfect: Vocal Pitch and the Emotional Intensity of Congressional Speech

   完美音高：国会演讲的音高和情感强度
   

5. Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?

   更公平的选举能增加政治家的回应性吗？
   

6. Why Some Persistent Problems Persist

   为什么有些问题会持续存在
   

7. Investment in the Shadow of Conflict: Globalization, Capital Control, and State Repression

   在冲突的阴影下投资：全球化，资本控制以及国家镇压
   

8. Can Violent Protest Change Local Policy Support? Evidence from the Aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles Riot

   暴力抗议能改变地方政策支持吗？来自1992年洛杉矶暴乱余波的证据
   

9. Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

   种族骚乱和亲社会行为：来自吉尔吉斯斯坦的证据
   

10. Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy

    大清洗：独裁政府自上而下的问责制
    

Letter

1. BARP: Improving Mister P Using Bayesian Additive Regression Trees

   BARP：用贝叶斯加性回归树改进Mister P
   

2. Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key

   民族志的政治理论
   

3. Does Public Opinion Constrain Presidential Unilateralism?

   民意会限制总统单边主义吗？
   

4. Concentrated Burdens: How Self-Interest and Partisanship Shape Opinion on Opioid Treatment Policy

   集中负担:自利和党派偏见如何塑造鸦片类药物治疗政策的意见
   

PART
三

精选译文

01 谁领导？谁跟随？利用社交媒体数据测量立法者和公众对问题的关注程度和议程设置

【题目】

Who Leads? Who Follows? Measuring Issue Attention and Agenda Setting by Legislators and the Mass Public Using Social Media Data

【作者】

PABLO BARBER´A，南加利福尼亚大学

ANDREU CASAS，纽约大学

JONATHAN NAGLER，纽约大学

PATRICK J. EGAN，纽约大学

RICHARD BONNEAU，纽约大学

JOHN T. JOST，纽约大学

JOSHUA A. TUCKER，纽约大学

【摘要】

立法者会回应民众的迫切需求吗？研究证明了民众关心的议题和政治家们解决的议题存在强烈的一致性，但是关于在设定政治议程中是谁领导谁的关键性证据还没有被发现。我们通过对第113届美国国会立法者和公众的推特信息进行细粒度的时间分析（fine-grained temporal analyses）回答了这个问题。在使用无监督方法将立法者和市民发送的推文分成不同主题后，我们用向量自回归模型（vector autoregression models）来探究谁的优先级更有力地预测市民和政治家的关系。我们发现立法者更可能追随，而非领导对公众议题的讨论，即使在我们控制了媒体的议程设置的影响之后，这种结果仍然成立。然而，我们还发现，立法者更可能对他们的支持者作出回应，而非对公众。

Are legislators responsive to the priorities of the public? Research demonstrates a strong correspondence between the issues about which the public cares and the issues addressed by politicians, but conclusive evidence about who leads whom in setting the political agenda has yet to be uncovered. We answer this question with fine-grained temporal analyses of Twitter messages by legislators and the public during the 113th US Congress. After employing an unsupervised method that classifies tweets sent by legislators and citizens into topics, we use vector autoregression models to explore whose priorities more strongly predict the relationship between citizens and politicians. We find that legislators are more likely to follow, than to lead, discussion of public issues, results that hold even after controlling for the agenda-setting effects of the media. We also find, however, that legislators are more likely to be responsive to their supporters than to the general public.

02 说服敌人：用包含优先级的选择和分配设计估算政党媒介的说服作用

【题目】

Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design

【作者】

JUSTIN DE BENEDICTIS-KESSNER，波士顿大学

MATTHEW A. BAUM，哈佛大学

ADAM J. BERINSKY，麻省理工大学

TEPPEI YAMAMOTO，麻省理工大学

【摘要】

媒体选择导致两极分化，还是仅仅反映了它？我们研究了该问题的一个重要方面：党派媒体如何在不同的媒体消费者群体之中促进态度两极分化。我们实施了一个新的实验设计，称为包含优先级的选择和分配（PICA）设计，它结合了自由选择和强制曝光。我们同时估计了由选择性曝光和党派媒体的说服效应导致的两极分化的程度。我们的设计也能让我们进行灵敏度分析，以解释和说明陈述偏好和实际选择之间的差异，这是先前使用相似设计的研究所忽略的一种偏见的潜在来源。我们发现党派媒体能够使它的常客和那些其他时候不会消费它的偶然客户都发生两极分化，但是在意识形态上对立的媒体也有可能够改善顾客中现存的两极分化状况。综上所述，这些结果加深了我们对媒体何时且如何使个体极化的理解。

Does media choice cause polarization, or merely reflect it? We investigate a critical aspect of this puzzle: How partisan media contribute to attitude polarization among different groups of media consumers. We implement a new experimental design, called the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, that incorporates both free choice and forced exposure. We estimate jointly the degree of polarization caused by selective exposure and the persuasive effect of partisan media. Our design also enables us to conduct sensitivity analyses accounting for discrepancies between stated preferences and actual choice, a potential source of bias ignored in previous studies using similar designs. We find that partisan media can polarize both its regular consumers and inadvertent audiences who would otherwise not consume it, but ideologically opposing media potentially also can ameliorate the existing polarization between consumers. Taken together, these results deepen our understanding of when and how media polarize individuals.

03 党派还是钱包？美国参议院的不平等代表

【题目】

The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate

【作者】

JEFFREY R. LAX，哥伦比亚大学

JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS，哥伦比亚大学

ADAM ZELIZER，芝加哥大学

【摘要】

近期关于美国政策制定的研究认为民意的代表被金钱所扭曲，因为美国富人的偏好比低收入人群的偏好更为重要。第二个扭曲——党派的回应性差异——没有被很好的研究，并且经常在关于富裕影响力的文献中被忽视或淡化。我们首次先后评估了这两种潜在的代表性扭曲（的研究）。我们通过利用从2001至2015年的49份唱票表决来做到这一点。我们发现富裕影响力被夸大了，并且它本身取决于党派——当参议院必须站队的时候党派胜过金钱。穷人更经常地从民主党那里得到他们想要的。富人更经常地从共和党那里得到他们想要的，但前提是在共和党人站在富人这一边。因此，党派引发、形塑，并且限制了富裕影响力。

Recent work on US policymaking argues that responsiveness to public opinion is distorted by money, in that the preferences of the rich matter much more than those of lower-income Americans. A second distortion—partisan biases in responsiveness—has been less well studied and is often ignored or downplayed in the literature on affluent influence. We are the first to evaluate, in tandem, these two potential distortions in representation. We do so using 49 Senate roll-call votes from 2001 to 2015. We find that affluent influence is overstated and itself contingent on partisanship—party trumps the purse when senators have to take sides. The poor get what they want more often from Democrats. The rich get what they want more often from Republicans, but only if Republican constituents side with the rich. Thus, partisanship induces, shapes, and constrains affluent influence.

04 完美音高：国会演讲的音高和情感强度

【题目】

Pitch Perfect: Vocal Pitch and the Emotional Intensity of Congressional Speech

【作者】

BRYCE J. DIETRICH，爱荷华大学

MATTHEW HAYES，莱斯大学

DIANA Z. O’BRIEN，莱斯大学

【摘要】

虽然音频档案在很多政治机构中是可获得的，但是他们提供的数据并没有受到研究人员足够的关注。然而，音频数据提供了重要的洞见，包括演讲者的情感状态的信息。利用有史以来最大的自然音频集合之一——74158份国会发言——我们引进了一种针对立法者情感强度的新测量方法：演讲者难以控制的音高的细微变化。将我们的测量方法应用到国会议员关于女性议题演讲上，我们发现相比于她们的男同事和她们关于其他主题的演讲，女性议员的演讲带有更大的情感强度。我们的两个补充分析表明，增高的音调与立法者更广泛的议题承诺是一致的，并且演讲的情感强度可能会影响其他法律制定者的行为。更一般地说，通过证明视听资料方法的效用，我们的研究凸显了一种研究政治演讲的新方法。

Although audio archives are available for a number of political institutions, the data they provide receive scant attention from researchers. Yet, audio data offer important insights, including information about speakers’ emotional states. Using one of the largest collections of natural audio ever compiled—74,158 Congressional floor speeches—we introduce a novel measure of legislators’ emotional intensity: small changes in vocal pitch that are difficult for speakers to control. Applying our measure to MCs’ floor speeches about women, we show that female MCs speak with greater emotional intensity when talking about women as compared with both their male colleagues and their speech on other topics. Our two supplementary analyses suggest that increased vocal pitch is consistent with legislators’ broader issue commitments, and that emotionally intense speech may affect other lawmakers’ behavior. More generally, by demonstrating the utility of audio-as data approaches, our work highlights a new way of studying political speech.

05 更公平的选举能增加政治家的回应性吗？

【题目】

Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?

【作者】

GEORGE KWAKU OFOSU，圣路易斯华盛顿大学

【摘要】

利用新的实验设计和对加纳离法治在2016个月中支出情况的研究，我检验了更公平的选举是否能够提高民主的回应性以及它是如何提高的。结果表明，在2012年加纳选举中，从被随机分配到选举日的密集监测的选区中选出的在位者，在其任期内的选取发展基金比较少监控的选区选出的在位者多19个百分点。来自各种类型选区的议员都平等地出席议会，这表明高水平的监控并不能使得政客们用选取服务代替议会工作。因果机制的检测提供了线索性的证据，即更为公平的选举能够通过在职者对选举支持的预期而不是选择更好的候选人来激励高绩效的。本文提供了选举廉洁对民主问责制影响的因果证据。

Leveraging novel experimental designs and 2,160 months of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana, I examine whether and how fairer elections promote democratic responsiveness. The results show that incumbents elected from constituencies that were randomly assigned to intensive election-day monitoring during Ghana’s 2012 election spent 19 percentage points more of their CDFs during their terms in office compared with those elected from constituencies with fewer monitors. Legislators from all types of constituencies are equally present in parliament, suggesting that high levels of monitoring do not cause politicians to substitute constituency service for parliamentary work. Tests of causal mechanisms provide suggestive evidence that fairer elections motivate high performance through incumbents’ expectations of electoral sanction and not the selection of better candidates. The article provides causal evidence of the impact of election integrity on democratic accountability.

06 为什么有些问题会持续存在

【题目】

Why Some Persistent Problems Persist

【作者】

ROBERT POWELL，加州大学伯克利分校

【摘要】

最近关于反叛乱、附庸国、外国援助、代理人战争的研究都使用委托-代理框架去研究委托人诱使代理人为委托人效力的能力。这些研究广泛地强调了道德风险问题和行为者有限的承诺力。后者通常是通过重复博弈逻辑来解决，在这种逻辑下，违反协议会招致未来的惩罚。本研究分析了一个相关的激励问题，它破坏了委托人诱使代理人为委托人效力的能力。如果委托人试图让代理人解决问题，如果解决了这个问题（i）为代理人带来了一个新问题，并且（ii）同时显著降低代理人对委托人施加未来成本的能力，重复博弈的强制机制将会崩溃。在这些情况下，委托人不能诱使代理人作出更多的努力，那么问题将持续存在。

Recent work on counter-insurgency, client states, foreign aid, and proxy wars uses a principal–agent framework to study the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on the principal’s behalf. This work broadly emphasizes the moral hazard problem and the actors’ limited commitment power. The latter is usually addressed through the logic of repeated games in which reneging on an agreement triggers future punishment. This study analyzes a related incentive problem that undermines the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on its behalf. The repeated-game’s enforcement mechanism tends to breakdown if the principal is trying to get the agent to resolve a problem that, if resolved, (i) creates an ongoing problem for the agent and (ii) simultaneously significantly reduces the agent’s ability to impose future costs on the principal. The principal cannot induce the agent to exert much effort in these circumstances, and the problem persists.

07 在冲突的阴影下投资：全球化，资本控制以及国家镇压

【题目】

Investment in the Shadow of Conflict: Globalization, Capital Control, and State Repression

【作者】

MEHDI SHADMEHR，芝加哥大学和卡尔加里大学

【摘要】

在冲突易发的社会，伴随政权更迭而来的对没收财产的恐惧减少了资本投资。投资的减少反过来又危害了经济，增加了政权更迭的可能性。本文研究了这些反馈渠道对全球化、资本控制、国家镇压和政权更迭之间的相互作用的影响。本文说明了在冲突易发的社会促进资本运转（例如，全球化、经济现代化和降低运输成本的技术）的过程增加了政权更迭的可能性，强化了精英群体对高强制力国家的需求。尤其是，为了限制他们的集体行动问题和控制政权更迭的政治风险，资本家支持实行资本管制的国家。我们识别出两种对抗力量，布瓦效应（the Boix Effect）和马克思效应（the Marx Effect），它们决定了在右翼政权中资本控制和国家镇压何时变得互补（纳粹德国），何时相互替代（拉丁美洲军事政权）。

In conflict-prone societies, the fear of expropriation that accompanies a regime change reduces capital investment. These reductions in investments, in turn, harm the economy, amplifying the likelihood of regime change. This article studies the implications of these feedback channels on the interactions between globalization, capital control, state repression, and regime change. I show that processes that facilitate capital movements (e.g., globalization, economic modernization, and technologies that reduce transportation costs) amplify the likelihood of regime change in conflict-prone societies and strengthen the elite’s demand for a strong coercive state. In particular, to limit their collective action problem and manage the political risk of regime change, capitalists support a state that imposes capital control. We identify two conflicting forces, the Boix Effect and the Marx Effect, which determine when capital control and state repression become complements (Nazi Germany) or substitutes (Latin American military regimes) in rightwing regimes.

08 暴力抗议能改变地方政策支持吗？来自1992年洛杉矶暴乱余波的证据

【题目】

Can Violent Protest Change Local Policy Support? Evidence from the Aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles Riot

【作者】

RYAN D. ENOS，哈佛大学

AARON R. KAUFMAN，纽约大学

MELISSA L. SANDS，加州大学默塞德分校

【摘要】

暴力抗议是剧烈的政治事件，但我们对于这些事件对政治行为的影响知之甚少。学者们通常将暴力抗议视作为了追求特定目标的深思熟虑的行为，由于缺乏合适的数据和难以确定因果关系，没有足够的证据表明暴动是否真的能够增加对这些目标的支持。利用地理编码数据，我们分析了1992年发生在一次选举之前的洛杉矶暴乱（近代美国历史上最受关注的政治暴力事件之一）之前和之后的政策支持。与一些学术文献和大众媒体的预期相反，我们发现暴乱使得民调转向对自由派的支持。通过调查这个转变的来源，我们发现这很可能是非裔美国人和白人流动提升的影响。值得注意的是，这种流动持续了十多年。

Violent protests are dramatic political events, yet we know little about the effect of these events on political behavior. While scholars typically treat violent protests as deliberate acts undertaken in pursuit of specific goals, due to a lack of appropriate data and difficulty in causal identification, there is scant evidence of whether riots can actually increase support for these goals. Using geocoded data, we analyze measures of policy support before and after the 1992 Los Angeles riot—one of the most high-profile events of political violence in recent American history—that occurred just prior to an election. Contrary to some expectations from the academic literature and the popular press, we find that the riot caused a marked liberal shift in policy support at the polls. Investigating the sources of this shift, we find that it was likely the result of increased mobilization of both African American and white voters. Remarkably, this mobilization endures over a decade later.

09 种族骚乱和亲社会行为：来自吉尔吉斯斯坦的证据

【题目】

Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

【作者】

ANSELM HAGER，德国康斯坦茨大学

KRZYSZTOF KRAKOWSKI，意大利卡罗·阿尔贝托学院

MAX SCHAUB，WZB柏林社会科学中心

【摘要】

种族骚乱影响亲社会行为吗？（研究）种族暴力的学者的普遍看法是骚乱加强了敌对族群内部的合作，但种族间的合作减少了。我们通过研究2010年吉尔吉斯斯坦奥什骚乱的余波来重新审视这个假定，在这场骚乱中，来自城市外的柯尔克孜人屠杀超过400名乌兹别克人。我们实施了一项代表性调查，它包括对亲社会行为的不引人注目的实验测量。我们的因果识别策略利用社区与军事装甲车距离间的变量，它们在策划暴乱中起到了重要的作用。我们发现受害社区的亲社会行为表现出显著的低水平。更重要的是，我们证明了这种减少在族群内部和族群之间都同样明显。利用定性访谈（数据），我们解析出两种机制，它们有助于解释这种族群内亲社会行为的惊人减少：受害的乌兹别克人感到被他们的同族抛弃了，受害程度的不同造成了一种怀疑的感觉。

Do ethnic riots affect prosocial behavior? A common view among scholars of ethnic violence is that riots increase cooperation within the warring groups, while cooperation across groups is reduced. We revisit this hypothesis by studying the aftermath of the 2010 Osh riot in Kyrgyzstan, which saw Kyrgyz from outside the city kill over 400 Uzbeks. We implement a representative survey, which includes unobtrusive experimental measures of prosocial behavior. Our causal identification strategy exploits variation in the distance of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles, which were instrumental in orchestrating the riot. We find that victimized neighborhoods show substantially lower levels of prosocial behavior. Importantly, we demonstrate that the reduction is similarly stark both within and across groups. Using qualitative interviews, we parse out two mechanisms that help explain the surprising reduction in ingroup   prosociality: Victimized Uzbeks felt abandoned by their coethnics, and variation in victimization created a feeling of suspicion.

10 大清洗：独裁政府自上而下的问责制

【题目】

Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy

【作者】

B. PABLO MONTAGNES，埃默里大学

STEPHANE WOLTON，伦敦政治经济学院

【摘要】

本文提出了一个新的理论框架来研究威权政体中大清洗的特征。我们认为大清洗是自上而下问责制的工具，目的是激励和筛选一大批代理人（例如，单一执政党成员和国家官僚）。我们证明了温和的大清洗中，官员被清洗的模式：而在暴力的清洗中，没有任何绩效指标能保证他们的安全的。被清洗代理人的比例与暴力强度的关系是非单调的。对于独裁者来说，增加暴力的强度总是会提高绩效，但只有在暴力程度一开始较低的情况下，才会改善独裁者对下属的选拔。因此，即使没有法律上的制约，独裁者也会受到下属策略行为事实上的约束。我们使用历史的（包括苏联的大清洗和wenge）和近期的（埃尔多安的清洗）事件来证明我们的主要理论发现。

This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework to study the features of mass purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that mass purges are an instrument of top-down accountability meant to motivate and screen a multitude of agents (e.g., single-party members, state bureaucrats). We show that the set of purged agents is well delineated in mild purges, whereas no performance indicator is a guarantee of safety in violent purges. The proportion of purged agents is non-monotonic in the intensity of violence. For the autocrat, increasing the intensity of violence always raises performance, but it improves the selection of subordinates only if violence is low to begin with. Hence, even absent de jure checks, the autocrat is de facto constrained by her subordinates’ strategic behavior. We use historical (including the Soviet purges and the Cultural Revolution) and recent (the Erdogan purge) events to illustrate our key theoretical findings.

11 BARP：用贝叶斯加性回归树改进Mister P

【题目】

BARP: Improving Mister P Using Bayesian Additive Regression Trees

【作者】

JAMES BISBEE，纽约大学

【摘要】

多级回归和事后分层（MRP）是目前将全国代表性调查的民意数据外推到较小的地理单位的黄金标准。然而，非参数正则化方法的创新能够进一步提高研究者将民意数据外推到感兴趣的地理单元的能力。我测试了一个正则化算法的集合，发现通过更加灵活的正则化方法实现多层模型还有实质性改进的空间。我提出了一种MRP的改进版本，它可以用一种称为贝叶斯加性回归树（BRAT，当与事后分层结合起来的时候又称作BARP）的非参数方法，以此取代多层模型。我通过大量的数据情境比较了这两种方法，证明了应用更强大的正则化方法将民意数据外推到目标地理单元的好处。我提供了应用BARP方法的R包。

Multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) is the current gold standard for extrapolating opinion data from nationally representative surveys to smaller geographic units. However, innovations in nonparametric regularization methods can further improve the researcher’s ability to extrapolate opinion data to a geographic unit of interest. I test an ensemble of regularization algorithms and find that there is room for substantial improvement on the multilevel model via more flexible methods of regularization. I propose a modified version of MRP that replaces the multilevel model with a nonparametric approach called Bayesian additive regression trees (BART or, when combined with post-stratification, BARP). I compare both methods across a number of data contexts, demonstrating the benefits of applying more powerful regularization methods to extrapolate opinion data to target geographical units. I provide an R package that implements the BARP method.

12 民族志的政治理论

【题目】

Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key

【作者】

MATTHEW LONGO，莱登大学

BERNARDO ZACKA，麻省理工学院

【摘要】

政治理论家应该从事民族志研究吗？在本文中，我们评估了最近一波政治理论家对民族志的（研究）兴趣，并解释了为什么它是一件好事。我们尤其侧重于民族志研究是如何产生Ian Shapiro所称的“问题化的重新描述”——即重新描述那些动摇了我们传统研究视角的政治现象，从而引发新的问题，揭示新的道德关切途径。我们认为（1）通过在相似的政治现象中揭示变化和偶然性的新水平，民族志能够发现规范研究的成熟课题；（2）通过揭示人们与政治价值的理解，它能够促进我们对于概念的思考；（3）通过捕捉个人对社会世界的体验，它可以使我们对各种形式的伤害产生共鸣，否则这些伤害将会被隐藏起来。对政治理论的追求是非常重要的。通过加深我们对制度的理解，民族志可以成为拯救分析专门化的解药，拓宽政治理论可以解答的问题的范围，重振子领域的争论，并与该学科建立显而易见的联系。

Should political theorists engage in ethnography? In this letter, we assess a recent wave of interest in ethnographyamongpolitical theoristsand explainwhyit is a good thing. We focus, in particular, on how ethnographic research generates what Ian Shapiro calls “problematizing redescriptions”—accounts of political phenomena that destabilize the lens through which we traditionally study them, engendering novel questions and exposing new avenues of moral concern. We argue that (1) by revealing new levels of variation and contingency within familiar political phenomena, ethnography can uncover topics ripe for normative inquiry; (2) by shedding light on what meanings people associate with political values, it can advance our reflection on concepts; and (3) by capturing the experience of individuals at grips with the social world, it can attune us to forms of harm that would otherwise remain hidden. The purchase for political theory is considerable. By thickening our understanding of institutions, ethnography serves as an antidote to analytic specialization and broadens the range of questions political theorists can ask, reinvigorating debates in the subfield and forging connections with the discipline writ large.

13 民意会限制总统单边主义吗？

【题目】

Does Public Opinion Constrain Presidential Unilateralism?

【作者】

DINO P. CHRISTENSON，波士顿大学

DOUGLAS L. KRINER，康奈尔大学

【摘要】

从规范层面上讲，总统单边主义对美国民主有利还是有害取决于对其行使和滥用的制约程度。因为制约单边行动的正式制度是薄弱的，一种新兴观点认为对单边主义最重要的约束也许是政治的，民意发挥着重要的作用。然而，现有的研究几乎没有提供民意约束单边主义行为的系统性证据。为了填补这个空白，我们利用向量自回归与格兰杰因果检验总统支持和行政命令之间的关系。从前有推测认为当他们的政治资本存量低的时候，总统会在万不得已的情况下越来越多地发布行政命令，与此相反，我们发现增长的支持率增加了主要单边行为的频率。低支持率反过来制约了单边权力的实施。

Whether presidential unilateralism is normatively advantageous or parlous for American democracy may depend on the extent to which a check remains on its exercise and abuse. Because the formal institutional constraints on unilateral action are weak, an emerging literature argues that the most important checks on unilateralism may be political, with public opinion playing a pivotal role. However, existing scholarship offers little systematic evidence that public opinion constrains unilateral action. To fill this gap, we use vector autoregression with Granger-causality tests to examine the relationship between presidential approval and executive orders. Contra past speculation that presidents increasingly issue executive orders as a last resort when their stock of political capital is low, we find that rising approval ratings increase the frequency of major unilateral action. Low approval ratings, by contrast, limit the exercise of unilateral power.

14 集中负担:自利和党派偏见如何塑造鸦片类药物治疗政策的意见

【题目】

Concentrated Burdens: How Self-Interest and Partisanship Shape Opinion on Opioid Treatment Policy

【作者】

JUSTIN DE BENEDICTIS-KESSNER，波士顿大学

MICHAEL HANKINSON，柏鲁克学院

【摘要】

自利何时会影响公众对于有争议的公共政策的看法？大多数政治学理论认为自利在民意中只是一种次要的力量。利用全国代表性调查数据，我们发现了财政和空间的自利和党派偏见都是如何塑造鸦片类药物治疗政策的意见的。我们发现大多数的受访者支持资料项目资金模式的再分配，然而根据对社区用药的过量率征税来资助治疗则并不那么受欢迎。此外，财政利己主义给收入较低的共和党人带来了交叉压力，将两党之间的支持率差距缩小了一半以上。我们还用实验检验了设置治疗诊所的空间负担如何改变政策偏好。当诊所被建议在离他们家近的地方建立时，不同政治派别的民众都不那么支持。这些结果强调了党派偏见和自利在塑造对有集中负担的公共政策的偏好方面是如何互相影响的。

When does self-interest influence public opinion on contentious public policies? The bulk of theory in political science suggests that self-interest is only a minor force in public opinion. Using nationally representative survey data, we show how financial and spatial self-interest and partisanship all shape public opinion on opioid treatment policy. We find that a majority of respondents support a redistributive funding model for treatment programs, while treatment funded by taxation based on a community’s overdose rate is less popular. Moreover, financial self-interest cross-pressures lower-income Republicans, closing the partisan gap in support by more than half.Wealso experimentally test how the spatial burden of siting treatment clinics alters policy preferences. People across the political spectrum are less supportive when construction of a clinic is proposed closer to their home. These results highlight how partisanship and self-interest interact in shaping preferences on public policy with concentrated burdens.

编  译：郑静

审  校：王志浩，魏鹏

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编辑：欧阳星

一审：郑    静

二审：宋    婷

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